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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1695 
_____________ 
 
ROSA PEREZ, Individually and o/b/o W.P. and L. P., Minors; 
 ELVIS PEREZ; W. P.; L. P., 
                                                                                                                                          
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF BERWICK; HEATHER ROOD; COLOMBIA COUNTY; TROY 
MANEVAL; ROGER BODWALK; GREG MARTIN; CHRISTOPHER WILSON; 
KIMBERLY MULLINGS; DAVID CHRISTINO; TWO UNKNOWN AGENTS OF 
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;  
STEVE LEVAN; TIFFANY PANETTA; PATRICK CAWLEY 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 4:07-cv-02291) 
District Judge:  Hon. Robert D. Mariani 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 12, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
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 Rosa Perez, individually and on behalf of then-minors W.P. and L.P., and Elvis 
Perez — collectively, “the Perez family” — appeal the grant of summary judgment to all 
defendants in a civil rights lawsuit brought in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Although the District Court found that the Borough of 
Berwick, Columbia County, and individual officers from those localities and from the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency did violate the Perez family‟s Fourth 
Amendment rights, the District Court held that no remedy could be granted pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The court made this determination because it found that the Perez 
family failed to establish a policy or custom on the part of Borough of Berwick and 
Columbia County, because Columbia County is entitled to immunity from suit in federal 
court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, and because 
the individual officers and agents sued were entitled to qualified immunity.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties‟ benefit, we recite only the facts essential 
to our disposition.  The Perez family initiated this lawsuit after officers from the Borough 
of Berwick Police Department (“Berwick”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”), and the Columbia County Adult Probation and Parole Department entered their 
home on March 21, 2007 to execute bench and administrative warrants on different 
individuals who allegedly lived there.  The Perez family‟s complaint, brought pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the family‟s right to be free from unreasonable searches, 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was violated by 
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the following entities and individuals:  Berwick; Columbia County; individual ICE 
agents
1
 Kimberly Mullings and David Christino; individual Berwick Police Officers 
Heather Rood-Comstock (“Rood”), Troy Maneval, Roger Bodwalk, Steve Levan, Greg 
Martin, and Christopher Wilson; and individual Columbia County Adult Probation and 
Parole Officer Tiffany Panetta.  The District Court found that the entry into the Perez 
family‟s home was unconstitutional because it involved execution of administrative and 
bench warrants only for “summary offenses and low grade misdemeanors,” Appendix 
(“App.”) 36, at the family‟s private residence at an hour well before dawn.2  The Perez 
family also contended that its constitutional rights were violated because the officers and 
agents allegedly failed to knock and announce themselves before entering the home, and 
because several officers and agents allegedly entered in an unnecessarily prolonged and 
violent manner, with at least some of the agents and officers wearing masks and drawing 
their guns on the unarmed Perez family.  The District Court did not directly address these 
claims. 
Despite the finding of a constitutional violation, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for all defendants (and, consequently, also denied the Perez family‟s 
own motion for summary judgment) because it found that all defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity.  The Perez family filed a motion for reconsideration only on the 
                                              
1
 Pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, the Perez family voluntarily moved to 
dismiss ICE agent Cawley when he was called upon to serve overseas in early 2011.  The 
motion was granted and Cawley was dismissed from the case on June 14, 2011. 
 
2
 The Perez family claimed the entry occurred at 4:00 a.m., while the defendants argued 
that it took place at 5:00 or 5:30 a.m.  The District Court properly took the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Perez family, adopting 4:00 a.m. as the time of entry.  App. 5. 
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grounds that Berwick and Columbia County are not eligible for qualified immunity.  The 
District Court recognized its error in having ruled that these entities received qualified 
immunity, but maintained that summary judgment should be granted as to Berwick 
because the Perez family failed to show, as required by Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that Berwick followed a policy or practice of performing 
the kind of unconstitutional execution of warrants experienced by the Perez family.  The 
District Court also found that Columbia County had been erroneously granted qualified 
immunity, but that it was nevertheless entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it concluded that the Probation and 
Parole Department of Columbia County is a branch of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, rather than an agency of Columbia County. 
 The Perez family appeals on the grounds that the District Court erred in finding no 
genuine issue of material fact as to the Perez family‟s Monell claim, and also erred in 
finding that Columbia County was entitled to immunity from suit in federal court.  The 
Perez family also contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the 
individual officers acted reasonably in light of clearly established law, such that they 
should receive qualified immunity from liability for the constitutional violations found by 
the District Court.  Finally, the Perez family argues that their constitutional rights were 
violated in additional ways not recognized by the District Court — namely, by the 
officers‟ failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement, the protracted and 
violent nature of the entry, and the officers‟ unlawful search of the home. 
II. 
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a), and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment.  Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 
310 (3d Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Perez family and draw all justifiable, reasonable inferences in their favor.  Id.  We affirm 
only if there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to one or more elements of 
the Perez family‟s claim and if the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
A. 
 We will begin with the District Court‟s finding that the Columbia County 
Probation and Parole Department receives immunity from this federal lawsuit pursuant to 
the Eleventh Amendment because the Probation and Parole Department is “not part of 
Columbia County,” but rather “an agency of the Commonwealth” of Pennsylvania.  App. 
33-34.  As this Court has pointed out, “the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits against 
subunits of the State.”  Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 
198 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 
(1984)).  Moreover, “[w]e have held that Pennsylvania‟s judicial districts, including their 
probation and parole departments, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”  
Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 198.   
 The Perez family‟s Second Amended Complaint names Columbia County — not 
the Columbia County Probation and Parole Office — as a defendant, and avers that 
“Defendant Columbia County is a municipality within the Commonwealth of 
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Pennsylvania that, at all times relevant hereto, operated the Columbia County Probation 
Department.”  App. 1220.  However, Columbia County denied this claim in its answer, 
stating that “it is specifically denied that Columbia County operated the County Probation 
Department with respect to the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint,” and 
asserting that “Defendant Panetta was acting as an officer of the court, which is a branch 
of the state for purposes of the alleged claims.”  App. 1288.  This assertion is supported 
by the rule this Court articulated in Benn v. First Judicial District of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 
241 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Pennsylvania‟s Judicial Districts are entitled to 
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment), which we underscored in 
Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 198 (elucidating that the Judicial Districts‟ immunity from suit 
extends to probation offices as well).  The fact that Probation Officer Panetta testified 
that she “work[ed] for Columbia County as a probation/parole officer,”  App. 493, does 
not change that Pennsylvania probation and parole departments are legally part of the 
Commonwealth‟s Unified Judicial District.  Accordingly, if the Columbia County 
Probation Office is, indeed, the entity the Perez family sued in the instant matter, we 
conclude that it is entitled to immunity from suit.   
Alternatively, we conclude the Perez family improperly named the municipality of 
Columbia County as a defendant in this lawsuit, since the municipality took no actions in 
the allegedly unconstitutional entry underlying the instant matter.  The Perez family 
appears to dispute that the municipality of Columbia County had no involvement in the 
March 21, 2007 entry into their home, arguing that Panetta worked for and was an agent 
of Columbia County, which had an unconstitutional policy of executing bench warrants 
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in the middle of the night.  Therefore, they claim, the county is liable under Monell v. 
Department of Social Services.  See 436 U.S. at 691 (holding that, although 
municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, no municipal 
liability lies under that statute “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of 
some nature caused a constitutional tort”).  The Perez family presents testimony that “the 
policy of Columbia County” is that “[a] bench warrant can be served anytime 24/7.”  
Perez Br. 20.  However, despite being characterized as “Columbia County‟s testimony,” 
that statement was actually given by Panetta, even though the very fact it seeks to prove 
is whether Panetta‟s actions and testimony can be attributed to Columbia County — that 
is, whether Panetta can be considered an agent of Columbia County.  Id.  As a result, we 
conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to the Columbia County 
defendant, regardless of whether the defendant named by the Perez family is the 
Columbia County Probation Office, or the municipality of Columbia County.  We hold 
that Panetta was not an agent of the municipality when she entered the Perez family 
home, as the Perez family points to no evidence that would rebut the Columbia County 
defendant‟s assertion — and this Court‟s law — that a probation officer works for a unit 
of the state, even if the probation office has the name of a county in its title.   
B. 
 The Perez family further argues that the District Court erroneously granted 
summary judgment on its § 1983 claim against Berwick.  The District Court found that 
the Perez family failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a 
Berwick policy or practice of allegedly unconstitutional conduct, so that the Perez 
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family‟s municipal liability claim against Berwick was deficient under Monell.  
Moreover, the Perez family also appears to be raising a question as to exactly what 
constitutional violation the District Court found.   
In its December 29, 2011 opinion granting summary judgment to the defendants, 
the District Court analyzed the following factors to conclude that Berwick (and other 
defendants) had violated the Perez family‟s constitutional rights:  “(1) time of the service 
of the warrants, (2) the fact that an arrest was made . . . , (3) the existence of any exigent 
circumstances, . . . and (4) the absence of a finding by a neutral magistrate that a 
nighttime execution was reasonable.”  App. 19.  In particular, the District Court focused 
on the fact that the entry took place at 4:00 a.m., explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court‟s 
long established jurisprudence . . . indicates a clear preference against the execution of 
warrants in the middle of the night.”  App. 20-21.  The Perez family points to evidence 
showing that Berwick did, indeed, maintain “policies or customs permitting the execution 
of bench and arrest warrants for misdemeanors and summary offenses any time day or 
night.”  App. 37.  Specifically, the Perez family presented the following testimony from 
the deposition of Berwick‟s chief of police:  “Q:  „Is it the policy of the Borough of 
Berwick that arrest warrants and bench warrants can be served any time day or night?‟  
A:  „Yes.‟”  App. 1106. 
However, as the District Court underscored in its February 10, 2012 memorandum 
opinion, its December 29, 2011 opinion “did not find Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 431(A)(1) and (2), which permit the execution of bench warrants at any time, 
constitutionally impermissible.”  App. 35.  Rather, the District Court came to the 
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“narrow” conclusion, “premised upon specific facts,” that “Berwick enforced an 
otherwise constitutional practice with regard to enforcement of arrest or bench warrants 
in circumstances rendering the otherwise lawful practice impermissible.”  App. 35-36.  
We agree that the constitutionality of Berwick‟s entry into the Perez family home is to be 
determined by more than just the time it took place.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
559 (1979) (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 
precise definition or mechanical application. . . . Courts must consider the scope of the 
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, 
and the place in which it is conducted.”).  In the instant case, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether or not Berwick‟s entry was unconstitutional, given the time 
the entry occurred, the length of the search that allegedly ensued, the fact that at least 
some officers (potentially Berwick‟s agents) wore masks and drew weapons on the 
family, and the alleged failure of the officers to knock and announce their presence.  
Moreover, the District Court did not consider whether Berwick‟s nighttime entry is 
customarily accompanied by these other aggravating factors, such that Berwick can be 
said to follow a policy or practice of entering homes in this way.
3
  Accordingly, we will 
                                              
3
 Although the ICE defendants argue before this Court that the Perez family waived its 
right to assert a knock-and-announce claim by failing to raise it below, it is evident that 
the Perez family‟s complaint did, indeed, claim a violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights in connection with defendants‟ entry into their home.  See, e.g., D.I. 13 (Am. 
Compl.), ¶ 27 (“As Rosa Perez opened the door, the defendants pushed her aside and 
swarmed into the plaintiffs‟ living room.”).  Moreover, the Perez family did include 
extensive discussion of the alleged knock-and-announce violation in their opposition to 
the defendants‟ summary judgment motion.  D.I. 153, 17-21.  The District Court did not 
address this argument. 
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vacate and remand to the District Court for it to determine whether summary judgment is 
appropriate as to Berwick‟s Monell liability. 
C. 
 Finally, the Perez family argues that the District Court erred in granting qualified 
immunity to the individual officers and agents who participated in the entry into the Perez 
family home.  In assessing a government official‟s entitlement to qualified immunity 
from suit, we determine whether a plaintiff‟s constitutional right was violated, and 
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that a 
reasonable person in the official‟s position would have known that his or her conduct 
violated it.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); see also Grant v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996) (clarifying that test for a “clearly established” 
right is an objective one).  We need not decide whether a constitutional violation took 
place if we find a constitutional right was not clearly established.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 
236.  The Perez family argues that the officers should not receive the protection of 
qualified immunity because they violated the family‟s clearly established constitutional 
rights by executing the bench and administrative warrants at night, failing to comply with 
the knock-and-announce requirement, unlawfully searching their home, and executing an 
unnecessarily long and violent entry.   
As far as the Perez family‟s right to be free from nighttime execution of 
administrative warrants is concerned, even if such a right does exist, we doubt that it was 
clearly established at the time of the incident, as the Perez family points to no statutes or 
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case law clearly establishing that principle.
4
  See Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 
396 (3d Cir. 1997) (“„Clearly established rights‟ are those with contours sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”).   
Nevertheless, we conclude that other allegations made by the Perez family — that 
the officers failed to abide by the knock-and-announce requirement, that the scope and 
length of their search was unreasonable and that they used excessive force in entering the 
Perez family‟s home — raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the individual 
officers are entitled to qualified immunity.  To begin with, the knock-and-announce 
requirement is a clearly established point of constitutional law.   Kornegay, 120 F.3d at 
396-97.  Furthermore, as a general matter, it is clearly established that an official search 
that exceeds the bounds of reasonableness is a constitutional violation, as is the use of 
excessive force by an officer — though both inquiries are intensely fact-driven.  See U.S. 
Const. amend. IV; Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir. 2003) (“To 
state a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  To determine whether the individual officers are 
entitled to qualified immunity, the District Court was required to consider whether, under 
the factual scenario of this case, the officers were reasonable to believe that their actions 
did not violate the Perez family‟s clearly established rights.  The District Court did not 
pursue this inquiry as to any claims other than the nighttime execution of the search 
                                              
4
 Moreover, the officers appeared either to be relying on their municipality‟s habitual 
practice (which they would reasonably have assumed was constitutional), or, in the case 
of the ICE agents, relying on the practice of the local officers. 
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warrant.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand so that the District Court may analyze 
the issue of qualified immunity on the Perez family‟s knock-and-announce, unreasonable 
search, and excessive force claims.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment to Columbia County.  We will vacate the grant of summary judgment as to 
Berwick and the individual officers, and remand to the District Court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
